Abstract-Internet-wide scanners are heavily used for malicious activities. This work models, from the scanned system point of view, spatial and temporal movements of Network Scanning Activities (NSAs), related to the difference of successive scanned IP addresses and timestamps, respectively. [7] . This work is here extended, covering spatial and temporal movements of a single execution of the scanner using the same modeling tools. These obtained models are then used to efficiently identify what scanning tool is used by attackers. We use here, as in [7] , real logs of probing packets of the scanners collected by a darknet. Since it has no active hosts, all incoming traffic is undesired. Collected datasets cover long intervals of time, containing logs of multiple executions of the scanning technique. We split then each dataset into samples containing logs of a single execution by considering time lapses between two consecutive scanned IP addresses: when it is an outlier, an execution ends and the following begins. Once these samples are available, they are used to learn mixture distribution models, and their respective HMMs. Mixture distribution models create clusters of logs contained in each sample and assign to each cluster a Gaussian distribution. HMMs, whose states are the clusters provided by the mixture model, are built and then applied to test samples to assess what scanning tool has been used to generate the collected logs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network Scanning Activities (NSAs) are "reconnaissance techniques able to determine open ports and services" [1] . They are used by attackers as first steps of exploitation attempts, to take control over the host [2] , exploit vulnerabilities [3] and gather information about the system that will be targeted by an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) [4] . To ensure efficient defense, threats need to be mitigated during the scanning activities [2] . Models describing scanning tools can help experts to assess if the network is being scanned and what scanning tool is faced.
Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) have been already applied to model the scanning intensity of Shodan [5] and ZMap [6] using logs collected by a darknet [7] . This work is here extended, covering spatial and temporal movements of a single execution of the scanner using the same modeling tools. These obtained models are then used to efficiently identify what scanning tool is used by attackers. We use here, as in [7] , real logs of probing packets of the scanners collected by a darknet. Since it has no active hosts, all incoming traffic is undesired. Collected datasets cover long intervals of time, containing logs of multiple executions of the scanning technique. We split then each dataset into samples containing logs of a single execution by considering time lapses between two consecutive scanned IP addresses: when it is an outlier, an execution ends and the following begins. Once these samples are available, they are used to learn mixture distribution models, and their respective HMMs. Mixture distribution models create clusters of logs contained in each sample and assign to each cluster a Gaussian distribution. HMMs, whose states are the clusters provided by the mixture model, are built and then applied to test samples to assess what scanning tool has been used to generate the collected logs.
To summarize, we firstly build mixture Gaussian models and HMMs of scanning tools by considering differences of destination IP addresses and timestamps of their successive probing packets perceived by a darknet. Secondly, we use the obtained HMMs to classify probing packets according to the network scanner that generated them.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews scanning methods, existing work on detection of NSAs and models. Section III details how to build and validate HMMs of the considered scanner. Section IV provides an excursus on the obtained experimental results and section V concludes the work and outputs future work.
II. RELATED WORK NMap 1 , ZMap [6] , Shodan 2 [5] and Masscan [8] are among the most known and used network scanners. Their usage varies around the world: ZMap is mainly used in western countries whereas Masscan and Unicorn 3 are popular in South East Asia [2] . Also the services they commonly target vary: one third of probes of ZMap are directed to port 22, whereas NMap mostly scans port 23 and Masscan mainly scans uncommon non-privileged ports [2] .
Approaches to detection of NSAs are split into two main categories: single-source and distributed approaches [9] . The former relate to single-source NSAs, that consist of a host collecting information about one (one-to-one) or multiple (oneto-many) hosts. The latter relates to detection of distributed NSAs, which exploit various hosts to gather information about one (many-to-one) or multiple (many-to-many) hosts. Since in this work we fingerprint both ZMap [6] and Shodan [5] , which are distributed scanners, we focus on the latter.
Coordinated NSAs, i.e., multiple single source scans such that, all together, cover a large portion of the targeted space and the overlap between portions of the space scanned by each scan is as small as possible, are detected by Gates [10] . This approach firstly detects single-source scans, and then merge them into coordinated ones if they act in an orchestrated manner. The scanning tool applied during a scanning campaign is identified by Ghiëtte et al. [2] , who focus on analyzing scanned ports and use inspections of source code of scanners to find characteristic patterns in scan traffic, applied then to identify the used scanning tool. This approach works then only when the source code of the scanner is available, which is not always the case (as for Shodan [5] ). We solve this issue, sharing the same goal (i.e., to detect the tool used by coordinated NSAs), by applying machine learning techniques: more in details, it relies on HMMs.
HMMs are a statistical tool [11] initially applied in speech recognition [12] . They have also been used to detect multistage network attacks [13] , and compared with neural networks decision tree algorithm. HMMs can be applied to model complex Internet attacks, consisting of several steps that may need an extended period of time to occur, and enhance current intrusion detection methods since the latter can only identify individual stages of complex and elaborated attacks, whereas HMMs can describe correlation and order of steps forming a complex attack, and need fewer training examples to provide good descriptions of the attack, if compared to decision tree algorithms and neural networks. HMMs have been also used to describe malicious traffic and attacks targeting SSH port 22 [14] , with the purpose of modeling behaviors of attackers. Our work aims to model first steps of complex attacks. The models we build can then be used by intrusion detection systems and also SIEMs (Security Information and Event Management) to improve their detection capabilities and to prevent complex and targeted attacks before they succeed.
III. CLASSIFICATION METHODOLOGY
Our goal is to assess what scanning tool originated logs gathered by a scanned network. Figure 1 provides an overview of the processing steps of the methodology to achieve this goal. The proposed approach consists in learning models of logs generated by each scanning tool, and applying these models to identify those tools in real traces. We leverage HMMs because they are able to easily handle observations from various unknown groups. We also aimed to answer the question "Is the scanning technique behaving differently according to the scanned port?".
A. From logs to samples
To accomplish these aforementioned tasks, real network logs of ZMap and Shodan, respectively, are used. After ordering them in an increasing chronological order, we computed differences of two consecutive destination IP addresses and of two successive timestamps (results of the latter differences are, later on, referred as "time gaps"). Then, common ports below 1024 between the two datasets are identified, and each dataset split into (sub-)datasets, one for each considered common port and scanner. Finally, for each (sub-)dataset, we extracted a "learning" dataset and analyzed its time gaps: when an outlier appears, an execution of the considered scanning technique has terminated and a new one starts. This leads to split the (sub-)dataset into sub-sets. Consecutive sub-sets are then merged into samples when their mutual Jaccard index is ≤ 0.1 (i.e., the overlapping between the two is small). This merging makes us sure that each sample contains logs of a single execution of the scanning technique. Data corresponding to time difference outliers in each sample are removed. Each sample is then labeled by its scanner type and targeted port, "scanner-port". The result is a set of labeled samples scanner-port-(i.e., zmap-22-). Figure 2 shows the number of packets (black) and of unique scanned IP addresses (red) contained in each sample generated by ZMap scanning port 80. Small size samples are discarded by considering only the ones whose length is greater than the average length of the obtained samples.
B. Learning models of scanning techniques
This work models spatial and temporal movements of scanners, i.e., differences of consecutive destination IP addresses and timestamps, respectively, with mixtures of Gaussian distributions and HMMs. This choice was made for both observations because time gaps are continuous, and because discrete distributions based on large samples can be easily approximated by the Gaussian distribution thanks to the Central Limit Theorem [15] .
Since one single Gaussian distribution is not sufficient to model logs in samples (see Figure 3) , mixture distribution models are required, which cluster logs and provide a probability to each cluster. Transition probabilities between clusters are provided by HMMs, whose states are the clusters outputted by the mixture Gaussian distributions model.
1) Mixture distribution models:
Samples contain logs from the scanned network. Since logs are in unobserved groups, each with its own Gaussian distribution, and the selection of one group is independent from the previous choice, independent Gaussian mixtures distribution models are needed. They consist of groups or clusters, each with its own Gaussian distribution 1 , 2 , . . . , , and a mixing distribution = ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ) which selects one of the clusters. The selection of the group is established by a random variable performing the mixing. The distribution , = 1, 2 . . . , , being active when the observation was done is unknown.
2) Hidden Markov Models (HMMs): Probabilities to move between clusters are provided by HMMs, that consist of an unobserved parameter process { : = 1, 2, . . . , } satisfying the Markov Property: Pr( | −1 , . . . , 1 ) = Pr( | −1 ), and a state-dependent process { : = 1, 2, . . . } such that its distribution depends only on the current state of :
. establishes the cluster of the observation. It is possible to go from a state to another with transition probabilities, associated with each pair of states [13] . The state remains unknown: only the observation is visible.
An HMM is generated from logs of each learning sample. Once all the HMMs are available, the question "What is the set of good candidate models for the considered observation?" needs to be answered. For this, each sample was fitted to the HMM built on sample , HMM and its log-likelihood computed. Figure 4 shows the normalized matrix of all the obtained log-likelihoods where rows represent samples and columns their associated HMMs. A normalized log-likelihood value close to 1 (i.e., color close to blue in Fig. 4) states for a good model for the considered sample. The obtained HMMs are then grouped using DBSCAN [16] which, requiring only two parameters, and the minimum number of points in each 1   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65  66  67  68  69  70  71  72  73  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65  66  67  68  69  70  71 cluster, gathers pairs of points whose distance is less or equal to the chosen and if one of them is surrounded by a sufficient number of other points. Then, once groups are formed, a model is selected from each one to be the searched candidate model for the considered cluster. Indeed, all models within a single group can be considered as equivalent to describe the underlying samples, but only a single one is required.
The result is a list of candidate models for each combination "scanner-port" (i.e., zmap-23-).
C. Fingerprinting of scanning techniques
All the candidate models are validated on test samples. For each of them, it is known the originating scanner and the targeted port: the corresponding couple "scanner-port" is the true label of the considered test sample. Each of them is fitted to each candidate model, and the log-likelihood computed: the model with the highest one best describes logs of the test sample, and its label "scanner-port" is stored as the predicted label of the test sample. Finally, we investigated if the proposed method is able to identify the scanner that originated the test sample, and eventually the scanned port, i.e., if true label and predicted label are equal.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In the performed experiments, one dataset for ZMap and one for Shodan, respectively, both containing logs of real IP traffic perceived by a darknet, have been used. Table I shows inner characteristics of the two scanners: ZMap being horizontal and fast when scanning one single port [6] , and Shodan being more massive and targeting various ports [5] .
Each dataset is split according to destination ports. Only (sub-)datasets related to the 17 ports in common between the two scanners and lower than 1024 4 are taken into account. So, in total, 34 (sub-)datasets have been analyzed. For each of 5 , and more in detail at the row labeled "zmap-443": one test sample generated by ZMap scanning port 443 has been labeled with the predicted label "zmap-995", nine with label "zmap-22", three with "zmap-21", etc. Only eight have been correctly labeled with the predicted label "zmap-443". Row "zmap-443" of Figures 5 and 7 , respectively, also shows that the number of test samples generated by ZMap targeting port 443 are more than the others. Accuracy is then computed by summing elements of the diagonals and by dividing the result by the number of all samples (i.e, the sum of all elements of the matrices).
A. Differences of scanned IP addresses
This section shows results obtained by applying the aforementioned methodology to model spatial movements of scanners, i.e., differences of two consecutive targeted IP addresses. 91,3% of the candidate HMMs have 2 states: this means that logs are clustered into 2 groups, mainly corresponding to backward or forward spatial movements over destination IP addresses, respectively. Figures 5 and 6 show how many test samples have been correctly and wrongly labeled when fingerprinting scanning activities. The methodology detailed in this paper correctly detects what scanning technique generated the test samples (see Fig. 6 ), but is not able to detect what port is targeted (see Fig. 5 ). Accuracy of the selected candidate models is tested as detailed in Section III-C. When assessing both the scanning tool generating logs of the sample and the targeted port, accuracy is really low (0.06). But, when focusing only on the detection of the scanning technique, it reaches 0.952. More in detail, we had 21 samples wrongly classified: 17 generated by Shodan labeled as being originated by ZMap, and 4 assigned to Shodan while truly generated by Zmap. It is possible, with a precision of 95%, to determine what scanner originated the test logs, and that spatial movements of the scanning activity do not vary with the scanned port and differ only between different scanners.
B. Time gaps
Differences of consecutive timestamps of logs (i.e., temporal movements) have been modeled following the methodology detailed in Section III. Selected candidate HMMs for differences of timestamps have between 1 and 7 states, with 92.2% having up to 4 states, and have been learned from the same learning samples used to learn HMMs for differences of IP addresses. A selection of candidate models for each combination "scanner-port", that are then tested on test samples, is then obtained.
Accuracy of models has been computed, both to detect only the scanning tool generating logs of test samples, and the scanned port together with the scanner. In the first case, accuracy is 0.98. The proposed methodology is then able to model and fingerprint ZMap and Shodan exploiting time gaps between consecutive logs, with a precision of 98%. But, accuracy for the pair "scanner-port" is low (0.16). This brings to the conclusion that ZMap and Shodan don't change their temporal behavior when targeting a particular port. Figures 7  and 8 show how many samples have been correctly/wrongly labeled. Only 10 test samples have been wrongly assigned to Shodan while being truly generated by ZMap (see Fig. 8 ). All samples generated by Shodan have been correctly classified.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Having accurate models of scanners is essential to early detect larger and more impacting attacks. To build such models, spatial and temporal movements (i.e., differences of two consecutive destination IP addresses and timestamps, respectively) of scanners have been investigated . Mixtures of Gaussian distributions have been exploited to build log clusters, and HMMs to compute transition probabilities between them.
Two predominant Internet-wide scanners, ZMap and Shodan, and 17 ports have been considered. For each pair "scanner-port", a bunch of learning samples have been extracted, each modeled with an HMM. Resulting HMMs have been clustered and a selection of candidate models outputted. All the selected models for all pairs "scanner-port" have been validated on test samples. Both for spatial and temporal movements, all the candidate HMMs can be used to identify what scanner originated logs in samples with an accuracy greater than 95%, but aren't able to detect the targeted port. This shows that behavior of scanners is not related to the targeted port and that attackers use the same configurations when scanning various ports.
This work can be enhanced by building HMMs to model both kinds of movements, and can be used to assess if a NSA is faced by the network and and what scanner is used. Various NSAs detection methods will be tested on the same dataset, and models produced here and in [7] will be used for early warning of cyber attacks and APTs, since scanning activities are often used in their reconnaissance phase [4] .
